As the cost of the war in Iraq exceeds $600 billion, we must ask ourselves: what ever happened in Afghanistan? We have spent more money in the last two years in Iraq than we have ever spent in Afghanistan. Yet more soldiers died in Afghanistan this summer than in Iraq. The United States is not focusing its military efforts meaningfully; it needs to withdraw from the civil conflicts that plague Iraq and invest in ending turmoil in Afghanistan.

Our presence in Iraq is counterproductive. The Iraq War technically lasted only 42 days, from March 20 to May 1, 2003, at which point the United States declared victory, and rightly so—it had control of the government and still does. But the current conflict in Iraq is a religious war between two sects with conflicting beliefs.

The problem is a centuries old culture clash that has existed since Iraq’s founding. While slightly over 4,000 U.S. soldiers have died in the course of the war, around 92,000 civilian deaths have been documented. More of the conflict is between Iraqis than between U.S. troops and insurgents.

Unlike international conflicts, civil wars originate from internal problems and historically, an external force cannot enforce peace indefinitely. The United States ought to take this lesson from its involvement in the civil war in Vietnam. By the standards of the Bush Doctrine, the United States had every justification to enter: Vietnam was mired in bloody political conflict that had already ousted two governments in three years. However, our presence proved fruitless. The war progressed nine years and killed over 50,000 people. The United States cannot adequately suppress political discord across the seas.

Not only is Iraq a hopeless cause, but winning would not serve any purpose. The primary target of U.S. military operations—guerilla leaders threatening the U.S. and other secular governments—had little connection with Iraq before our entrance. Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s dictator at the time of the U.S. invasion, kept tight security preventing terrorists and saboteurs from operating in the country. His power would have been compromised by a religious war. However, scandals surrounding our entrance, from prisoner abuse at the Abu Graib facility to indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay, have (not surprisingly) turned Iraqi sentiments against the U.S. This in turn has fueled increasing recruitment by terrorist groups. We are actively creating hostilities that make our own situation more perilous.

However, we do have an opportunity to aid Afghanistan. Unlike in Iraq, where internal issues have spun out of control, 91 percent of Afghanis do not support the Taliban, according to ABC News. While many Afghanis do not support U.S. presence, a vast majority do not wish to see a Taliban government. In Afghanistan, U.S. goals have the support of the populace.

The Taliban have also been blatantly hostile to the United States. They have repeatedly refused to extradite dangerous criminals, including Osama bin Laden on two occasions. A government open to extradition is key to maintaining U.S. security; six of the top ten most wanted terrorists are in Afghanistan.

Our government seems to be responding to something of a military sunk cost fallacy. We have invested too many resources, we have taken too many risks, we have put our international image at risk. We cannot afford to lose in Iraq. This is a mind-set typical of gambling addicts. We need to be rational and make decisions that are respectful of taxpayer dollars and soldier’s lives. This means admitting failure in Iraq and moving on to a more meaningful enterprise in Afghanistan.